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ABSTRACT 
 
This study reports the results of an investigation into the profitability of audit engagements. 
The study is motivated by the frequently expressed concern regarding the lack of 
competitiveness on the audit market, based on trends of increasing concentration of suppliers 
in this market. The argument is that increasing concentration facilitates collusion and 
monopoly behavior, allowing firms to raise price above cost. A direct test of this argument 
would be to test the effect of elements of market structure on the ratio between price and costs 
(i.e. profitability). Industrial organization and industrial economics research has seen studies 
on this issue for a multitude of industries, but not for the audit industry. Due to unavailability 
of data particularly on audit costs, audit market research has attempted investigate the 
competitiveness of the market mainly by examining audit fees and audit production data.  
The current study attempts to investigate directly whether higher market concentration 
allows firms to raise price above cost. Based on insights from the audit fee and production 
literature, the economics of industrial organization, and the relatively recent studies on local 
(rather than national) audit markets, a model for explaining audit engagement profitability is 
constructed. This model is tested empirically on a sample of 114 audit engagements 
conducted by one of the (then) Big 6 audit firms. The results show that the audit market 
structure differs across local audit markets, and that this local structure has a significant 
influence on audit engagement profitability. In addition, some factors that have shown to be 
important determinants in prior audit fee and production studies are also significant in this 
study’s profitability model. These relate to client risk and financial distress, the length of the 
relationship between the auditor and the client, and client complexity. 
The results for local audit market structure suggest that, as expected, higher market 
share in local markets allows the audit firm to raise price above cost. This can be interpreted 
as a sign of market power. However, some alternative explanations for the empirical results of 





Keywords: audit services, audit engagement profitability, audit markets 
 
Data availability: The data used for constructing market shares are publicly available from the 
source indicated in the paper. The other data used in this study are proprietary to the audit 
firm studied and cannot be released by the author. 1 
DETERMINANTS OF THE PROFITABILITY OF AUDIT ENGAGEMENTS 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent merger between the Big 6 firms Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand has 
once again stimulated the discussion on the competitiveness of the audit market. Since the late 
1970s, concerns regarding the (lack of) competition on the audit market have been expressed 
regularly, based on trends of increasing concentration of suppliers in this market (see e.g. 
Danos and Eichenseher 1986). The general argument is that increasing concentration 
facilitates collusion and monopoly behavior, allowing firms to raise price above costs (see 
Shepherd 1990, 105; Yardley et al. 1992, 159; Martin 1993a, 196-197; Carlton and Perloff 
1994, 331). A direct test of this argument would be an assessment of the influence of market 
structure (in terms of concentration measures) on the ratio between price and costs (i.e., 
profitability). In the field of industrial organization and industrial economics, many studies 
relating market structure to profitability have been conducted for a multitude of industries. 
However, such studies are scant with respect to the audit industry.
1 This paucity is mainly due 
to the unavailability of data on audit profitability, and more specifically, audit costs (see 
Dopuch and Simunic 1980, 78; Dopuch and Simunic 1982, 416; Yardley et al. 1992, 160, 
174). Therefore, audit market research has attempted to investigate the issue of 
competitiveness in other ways. Besides studies that simply document the extent of seller 
concentration in the audit market (see e.g. Rhode et al. 1974; Tomczyk and Read 1989; Tonge 
and Wootton 1991; Wootton et al. 1994), these are mainly studies on audit fees and audit 
production, which will be reviewed in the subsequent section. As will be discussed, the results 
from these studies generally suggest that the audit market is competitive. 
  The current study attempts to investigate directly whether higher market concentration 
allows firms to raise price above cost. Based on insights from the audit fee and production 2 
literature, industrial organization research, and the relatively recent studies on local and 
regional (rather than national) audit markets, a model for explaining audit engagement 
profitability is constructed. This model is tested empirically on a sample of audit engagements 
conducted in 1997 by one of the (then) Big 6 audit firms in the Netherlands. As far as I know 
only two other studies, Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000), have attempted to 
explain the profitability of audit engagements. However, these studies’ profitability models 
only include client and engagement characteristics from audit fee and production models and 
no market structure measures. The current study aims to provide a more complete picture by 
integrating insights from the audit fee/production literature and industrial organization 
research. Furthermore, I believe that the measure of audit costs used in the profitability 
measure in the current study presents a more accurate description of actual audit costs 
incurred by the audit firm than the measure of audit costs that Simunic and Stein (1996) and 
Dopuch et al. (2000) use in their profitability measure.  
  In a sense, the current paper is a complement to an earlier paper on the efficiency of audit 
engagements. Applying the statistical technique of stochastic frontier estimation to the same 
sample of audit engagements used in this paper, Schelleman and Maijoor (2001) found that 
audit engagements were performed in a cost and labor efficient manner, implying that the 
services could not have been performed with less audit hours and for less audit costs. These 
results can be interpreted as consistent with a (price-)competitive audit market that has 
disciplined auditors to conduct audits efficiently (see Dopuch et al. 2000, 1). Superior 
operating efficiency and performance is generally expressed in terms of lower costs, implying 
higher profitability (Yardley et al. 1992, 162, 176). This causal relationship between 
efficiency and the resultant higher profitability forms the central tenet of the Chicago-UCLA 
school’s explanation for an observed positive relationship between concentration and/or 
market share and profitability. In this explanation, usually attributed to Demsetz (1973), it is 3 
claimed that both higher concentration and/or market share and higher profitability result from 
the superior efficiency of larger firms. The efficiency school’s hypothesis contrasts with the 
mainstream industrial organization structuralist interpretation of an observed positive 
association between concentration and/or market share and profitability. In the structuralist 
view, such a positive relationship reflects market power: higher profitability follows from 
collusion or monopoly behavior, which is facilitated by higher concentration and/or market 
share (see also above).  
This paper does not intend to distinguish between these two explanations. Indeed, the data do 
not allow to do so, as data on more than one firm (and preferably: all firms) in an industry are 
needed to attempt to do so. The aim of this paper is more modest, as it simply tries to develop 
a model that can explain the profitability of audit engagements. 
  The remainder of this paper, then, is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
research. Section 3 discusses the variables and model specification used in this study. Section 
4 describes the data collection. Section 5 presents the analysis and the results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Prior research 
To my knowledge only two other studies, Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000), 
have investigated the profitability of audit engagements. The models that these papers use for 
explaining audit engagement profitability only include client and engagement characteristics 
from the audit fee and production literature.
2 The current paper attempts to find a more 
complete representation by including elements from industrial organization literature. 
Therefore, in addition to audit fee and audit production literature, this section also discusses 
insights from industrial organization research on the relationship between market structure 
and profitability. A third literature that I believe is relevant in constructing a model for 4 
explaining audit engagement profitability is the (recent) literature on local or regional (as 
opposed to national) audit markets. 
  Simunic (1980) was the first to develop an extensive model of audit fees. In examining the 
competitiveness of the audit market he hypothesized and found factors relating to auditee size, 
auditee complexity, auditee asset composition, auditee industry, auditee risk and financial 
distress, auditor’s tenure and auditor type (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) to be associated with 
audit fees. Simunic’s study has initiated a large stream of research replicating and extending 
his work. Besides assessing the competitiveness of the audit market (see e.g. Francis 1984) 
these studies have investigated a multitude of issues, such as reputation effects (e.g. Craswell 
et al. 1995), the provision of nonaudit services (e.g. Palmrose 1986b), off-peak pricing (e.g. 
Francis and Stokes 1986), learning over time (e.g. Chung and Lindsay 1988), price-cutting 
(e.g. Simon and Francis 1988), and client participation (e.g. Stein et al. 1994). Although the 
studies’ findings are mixed with respect to some of these issues, in general the audit fee model 
is fairly robust across time periods, countries and sample composition, and a number of results 
are consistent across the majority of audit fee studies. For instance, auditee size, auditee 
complexity, auditee asset composition and auditee financial distress are all positively 
associated with audit fees. Furthermore, most fee studies show high explanatory power, 
suggesting that the audit market is (price) competitive (see Yardley et al. 1992, 160). A 
limited number of fee studies have examined the effect of market structure on audit fees. Both 
Maher et al. (1992) and Sanders et al. (1995 found that audit fees decreased in a period of 
increasing competition. Pearson and Trompeter (1994) and Iyer and Iyer (1996) have both 
studied the effect of (supplier) concentration on audit fees, motivated by the concerns quoted 
in the Introduction that lower levels of competition – supposedly evidenced by higher levels 
of concentration – may result in higher fees. Pearson and Trompeter (1994) report that 
increasing concentration significantly decreases audit fees, thus providing counterevidence to 5 
the above concerns. In contrast, Iyer and Iyer (1996) find no significant relationship between 
concentration and audit fees. In general, these studies’ findings support the suggestion that the 
audit market is (price) competitive. More evidence on price competition is provided by fee 
studies investigating price-cutting. Price-cutting is a special case of low-balling (Francis and 
Simon 1987). Low-balling involves setting initial fees at a level lower than total audit costs 
(DeAngelo 1981, 113), and is a competitive reaction to the presence of quasi-rents to 
incumbent auditors (Yardley et al. 1992, 160). A number of audit fee studies suggest that 
auditors engage in price-cutting on initial audit engagements (see Francis and Simon 1987; 
Simon and Francis 1988; Turpen 1990; Gregory and Collier 1996).  
  Audit production studies are relevant to the current study in that they confirm the 
robustness of the audit fee model. Initial unavailability of data on audit production led 
researchers to base inferences about audit production on audit fees. When data on audit 
production did become available, audit production models built upon models from audit fee 
studies, using data on client and engagement characteristics shown to be important 
determinants of audit fees in prior research. Generalizing, these audit production studies found 
that factors important in explaining variation in audit fees are also important in explaining 
variation in audit production (see e.g. Palmrose 1989; Davis et al. 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1994; 
Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997). 
  As stated in the Introduction, data on audit costs are scarce. A limited number of recent 
studies, however, have had data on (surrogates of) audit costs at their disposal (see Davis et al. 
1993; Dopuch et al. 2000; Schelleman and Maijoor 2001). Application of the audit fee and 
production model to these audit cost data once again showed the robustness of the model. Just 
like for audit fee and audit production data, factors relating to auditee size, auditee 
complexity, auditee asset composition, auditee industry, auditee risk and financial distress, 
auditor’s tenure and auditor type are very well able to explain variation in audit costs. 6 
  As far as I know, until now only Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000) have 
investigated the profitability of audit engagements. In a paper on the relationship between 
audit pricing and litigation risk, Simunic and Stein (1996) perform a number of supporting 
tests, one of which was to test the effect of auditee size and a number of risk measures on a 
measure of audit engagement profitability.
3 I will provide a more elaborate discussion of their 
results and its interpretation in Section 5, where the results of the current study are presented. 
Suffice it to state here that auditee size was the only significant variable and that the 
explanatory power of the model was rather poor, certainly when compared with that of the 
audit fee, production and cost model.  
The latter also applies to the model tested by Dopuch et al. (2000). Their profitability model 
was more extensive than that of Simunic and Stein (1996) and included measures of auditee 
size, auditee complexity, auditee risk, auditor tenure, reliance on internal control, provision of 
nonaudit services, and the relative (in)efficiency of audit production. Significant variables 
were auditee size, auditor tenure indicators for first and second year engagements, reliance on 
internal control, variables indicating the provision of nonaudit services, and those measuring 
the relative (in)efficiency of audit production. Again, a more elaborate discussion is provided 
in Section 5.  
  As indicated in the Introduction, industrial organization and industrial economics research 
has studied the relationship between market structure and profitability for a multitude of 
industries. The work of Bain (1951) is generally seen as the foundation of empirical work in 
this field (Martin 1993a, 196). For a cross-section of industries, he hypothesized and found 
that entry conditions and market concentration had a significant effect on industry profits. His 
study has seen many replications and extensions, both on a market (i.e. inter-industry) and 
industry (i.e. intra-industry) level. All these studies have tested similar models relating market 
structure variables such as market share, market concentration and entry-barrier conditions, 7 
and other variables such as growth and capital intensity to profitability. The earlier studies 
focused on the profitability of entire industries and have basically employed two approaches: 
an industry-based approach using industry-wide data, and a company-based approach using 
individual company data (Shepherd 1990, 108). In a review of early inter-industry studies 
Weiss (1974) concludes that most studies exhibit a significantly positive relationship between 
market concentration and profitability. However, Schmalensee (1989, 976) finds that the more 
recent inter-industry studies show that the relationship between concentration and profitability 
is weak at best and that the effect is usually small. Furthermore, when market share is added 
to the model, the effect of concentration on profitability is found to become insignificant, 
suggesting that market shares dominate concentration effects (Geroski 1988, 110; Scherer and 
Ross 1990, 429). According to Carlton and Perloff (1994, 355) cross-sectional (inter-industry) 
studies have two serious shortcomings: (1) it may not be realistic to presume that the same 
relationship between market structure and profitability holds across all industries. This may be 
due to differences in regulation, product differentiation, the nature of sales transactions, 
concentration of buyers and the way in which profitability is computed (Besanko et al. 1996, 
311-312); (2) concentration ratios published by official government agencies (in this case, US 
Census) may not correspond to concentration ratios for relevant economic markets. This has 
led researchers to focus on industry-specific studies, over time or at different locations using 
firm-level or line-of-business-level data (see Carlton and Perloff 1994, 356). These studies 
confirm results from cross-section studies in that the relationship between concentration and 
(proxies for) entry barriers on the one hand and profitability on the other is weak at best 
(Carlton and Perloff 1994, 357), that the positive effect of market share on profitability is 
larger than that of concentration (indeed if any), and that market share dominates 
concentration in its effects on profitability if both concentration and market share measures 
are present in the same model. 8 
  Both inter-industry and intra-industry studies suffer from a number of measurement 
problems with respect to measures of profitability, market share and concentration, and other 
explanatory variables such as entry barriers. Hypotheses on the relationship between market 
structure and profits refer to economic profits. However, since measures of economic profits 
are not easily obtainable, researchers have resorted to surrogate measures based on accounting 
profits. To correct for differences between economic and accounting profits (Clarke 1985, 
104; Schmalensee 1989, 962; Geroski 1988, 111) many researchers have added control 
variables to their profitability model such as capital, advertising, and R&D (Clarke 1985, 106; 
Carlton and Perloff 1994, 358). Also, measures of concentration and market share are likely to 
be biased because of improper market definitions that do not reflect relevant economic 
markets (Carlton and Perloff 1994, 347). A market definition needs to be broad enough to 
include substitutes, but also narrow enough to exclude nonsubstitutes (Dopuch and Simunic 
1980, 79). Furthermore, allowance should be made for the fact that many markets are local or 
regional rather than national, and for import and export competition (Carlton and Perloff 
1994, 348). Also, many of the proxies for entry barriers are not exogenous and/or frequently 
have substantial measurement bias (Carlton and Perloff 1994, 348). Finally, measures of 
profitability and market share and concentration are often biased because of incorrect 
aggregation across products. Hence, product-level data are preferable to firm-level or 
industry-level data (Carlton and Perloff 1994, 358).  
  On a more conceptual level, industrial organization researchers have debated over the 
interpretation of a positive association between market structure and profitability (see e.g. 
Martin 1993b, 486). As indicated in the Introduction, mainstream industrial organization 
research has a structuralist view and considers the positive relationship between market 
structure and profitability a consequence of the firm’s market power. In contrast, the Chicago-
UCLA efficiency school claims that both higher concentration and/or market share and higher 9 
profitability result from the superior efficiency of larger firms. Proponents of both views 
maintain that the empirical evidence supports their hypothesis, but effectively, the evidence 
has a hard time discriminating between the market power and efficiency hypothesis. 
Practically speaking, the distinction between the market power and efficiency explanation has 
no implications for the construction of the audit engagement profitability model, as both 
views suggest the same explanatory variables be included in the model. In addition, and more 
importantly, as stated in the Introduction, the data for this study do not allow to distinguish 
between the two explanations, as data on more than one firm in an industry are needed to be 
able to do so.  
  As was briefly indicated above, many markets are regional or local rather than national 
(see Shepherd 1972, 29). For instance, in an overview of studies on the relationship between 
market structure and profitability for banks, Gilbert (1984) indicates that the proper measure 
for market structure for banks is concentration in local market areas. “..(..)..relevant market 
areas for banking services are substantially smaller than states of the nation.(..)” (Gilbert 
1984, 629). A number of recent auditing studies suggest that the same might be the case for 
audit services. In motivating their study in which they compare the concentration on local 
markets (defined here as single Metropolitan Statistical Areas) for the accounting, advertising 
and law industry, Penno and Walther (1996, 90) indicate that local rather than national 
concentration measures are more appropriate for professional services industries since 
“goods” in these types of industries are generally less transportable than in other industries 
(such as manufacturing), and the availability of professional services firms depends on the 
location of their personnel (Penno and Walther 1996, 96). Similarly, Francis et al. (1999, 186) 
argue that it is the city-based (instead of national) offices of Big 6 firms that contract for 
audits, oversee the performance of these audits and issue audit reports for clients located in 
the same area. They study (and find considerable) variation in Big 6 market shares across 10 
local (city-specific) audit markets, suggesting that the reputation of the Big 6 audit firms is not 
standard but varies from one local market to another. In that case, the use of national rather 
than local market share data could hide important differences in market shares between local 
markets. Referring to the argument made by Francis et al. (1999), Barkess and Stokes (2000) 
study the role of local audit markets (east versus west of Australia) in auditor 
selection/switching decisions by clients, stating that the choice for an audit firm is made from 
among audit firms that operate in the same local market. Their results imply that studying 
switching decisions is more informative in a local market context than in a national market 
context. 
  The findings above suggest that it might be more appropriate to study audit phenomena in 
a local or regional rather than national market setting. Therefore, I study the effect of local 
rather than national audit market structure on audit engagement profitability.  
 
3. Variables and model 
Based on the prior literature discussed in Section 2, I have constructed a model to explain 
audit engagement profitability. The current section discusses the model and its variables. 
 
3.1 Measurement bias and market definition 
As indicated, this paper studies the profitability of a sample of individual audit engagements 
of one of the (then) Big 6 audit firms. Thus, this is not only an intra-industry, but also an intra-
firm study. As Carlton and Perloff (1994, 357) suggest, and as discussed earlier, many studies 
investigating the relationship between market structure and profitability suffer from 
measurement biases with respect to the market structure and profitability measures that these 
studies use. These biases are mainly due to incorrect aggregation across products. Therefore, 
product-level data are preferable to firm-level or industry-level data. Using data for individual 11 
audit engagements corresponds to using product-level data, allowing the computation of an 
audit engagement profitability measure that is not biased by other, nonaudit, services.
4 As will 
be seen in Section 4 on data collection, the data used for computing market structure measures 
allow to calculate measures that also only concern audit services and exclude other nonaudit 
services. Thus, the profitability measure on the one hand and the market structure measures on 
the other can be expected to be reasonably well matched. Additionally, the market definition 
used in this study does not seem to suffer from the definition problems often cited in the 
industrial organization literature (see e.g. Cubbin 1988, 28-29; Scherer and Ross 1990, 423; 
Martin 1993b, 452). After all – and keeping in mind Bain’s (1951, 298) definition of an 
industry – there are no close substitutes for a statutory financial audit.
5  
 
3.2 Dependent variable: profitability measure 
Prior industrial organization literature has shown the use of a number of different profitability 
measures, such as profit rates, rates of return, price-cost margins and Tobin’s q ratio (see e.g. 
Schmalensee 1989, 960-961; Shepherd 1990, 113-116; Scherer and Ross 1990, 415-422). As 
discussed in Section 2, the literature has also shown that there are many problems in 
measuring profitability. The profitability measure used in the current study is adapted from 
the measure used by both Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000) which they call 
realization rate. They define this rate as the ratio of actual to standard total audit fee.
6 In both 
papers actual total audit fee is the actual fee paid to the audit firm by the client, and standard 
total audit fee is the fee charged to the client if the actual audit labor hours were billed at the 
firm’s standard billing rates. Dopuch et al. (2000, 13) use this latter standard fee measure as a 
proxy for total audit cost. The numerator of the profitability measure used in the current study 
is the same as the one used by Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000) in their 
realization rate, viz. the actual audit fees that the client paid to the audit firm. The 12 
denominator of the current paper’s profitability measure, however, differs from that of 
Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000). It is a measure of total audit costs as well, 
and consists of the following components: (1) actual number of audit hours spent per staff 
level, times the internal hourly rate differentiated per staff level per engagement, summed 
over all staff levels
7; and (2) out-of-pocket costs (see Davis et al. 1993, 138). This measure of 
audit costs differs from that used by Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000) in 
that this paper does not use standard billing rates per staff level, but the actual internal hourly 
rates per staff level charged to each individual audit engagement. Since the data show that 
these actual rates per staff level cover a broad range, I consider the use of differentiated billing 
rates to compute audit costs more accurate than that of billing rates per staff level that are 
equal over all engagements.
8 In addition, I also include out-of-pocket costs incurred per 
engagement in my cost measure. In all, I believe this cost measure may present a more 
accurate picture of the actual audit costs incurred by the audit firm in conducting audit 
engagements than the measure used by Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000).  
It may be noted that the bulk of my cost measure consists of costs related to human capital. I 
feel that this is not inappropriate, as audit firms are professional service organizations whose 
most important input is human capital. Therefore, the majority of costs associated with audit 
engagements consist of the costs of use of labor hours. This is in line with the argument made 
by O’Keefe et al. (1994, 245), who do not consider capital inputs in their study on the 
production of audit services, as they feel that these are of second-order importance. 
Furthermore, allocation of the costs related to these capital inputs to individual audit 
engagements may be difficult, possibly resulting in arbitrary allocations and thus inaccurate 
cost measures.  
 13 
3.3 Independent variables from prior audit fee and production studies 
Prior audit fee and production studies (see Section 2) suggest a number of variables that 
influence audit fees and audit costs. Since this study’s audit engagement profitability measure 
is a ratio of audit fees to audit costs, and to the extent that the variables may differentially 
influence fees and costs, it can be expected that these variables also influence audit 
engagement profitability. The selection of variables included in the profitability model is 
based on the review of prior audit fee and production studies in Section 2 and concerns factors 
related to client size, client complexity, client asset composition, client risk and financial 
distress, quality of client internal controls, auditor’s tenure, and the auditor’s provision of 
nonaudit services. The specific variables used are the same as those in Schelleman and 
Maijoor (2001) and are shown in Table 1 below. 
[Table 1 here] 
As noted in the Introduction, the audit engagements in this study’s sample are cost and labor 
efficient (see Schelleman and Maijoor 2001). Therefore, in contrast to Dopuch et al. (2000) 
who do find inefficiencies in their sample, no inefficiency measures are included in this 
study’s model.  
The expected signs in the table will be explained below.  
  Based on the suggestion (e.g. by Simunic and Stein 1990, 1996) that auditors may adjust 
billing rates for differences in their business risk, audit engagement profitability might be 
expected to be positively related to risk indicators. Starting from this premise, the risk 
indicators audit opinion type, client leverage, client inherent risk, client loss in last two years, 
and listed (versus unlisted) client company have an expected positive sign, and the risk 
indicators client profit margin and client control quality have an expected negative sign. 14 
  The hypothesized signs for the auditor tenure indicators are negative, based on evidence 
from a number of audit fee studies that suggest auditors engage in price-cutting (Dopuch et al. 
2000; see Section 2 for a number of these studies).
9 
  Client size may be hypothesized to be positively related to profitability per engagement, 
based on the expectation that audit firms have relatively greater bargaining power with larger 
clients (see Dopuch et al. 2000). This may be due to a higher valuation of the auditor’s 
services by larger clients, or the more limited supply of audit firms for larger clients, or both. 
Alternatively, a larger client represents a greater economic interest to the audit firm, which, as 
DeAngelo (1981, 117) argues, may decrease the auditor’s independence with respect to this 
client. Effectively, this increases the client’s (compared to the auditor’s) bargaining power, 
implying a negative relationship between audit engagement profitability and client size. Since 
I have no a priori reason to expect one effect to dominate the other, I do not hypothesize any 
sign for client size. 
  I do not hypothesize a sign for nonaudit services either. On the one hand, just like for 
client size the audit firm’s bargaining power may increase with the provision of nonaudit 
services to their clients, implying an expected positive sign (see Dopuch et al. 2000). On the 
other hand, prior research on nonaudit services argues that the audit may serve as a loss-leader 
for nonaudit services (see e.g. Hillison and Kennelley 1988, 33), implying an expected 
negative sign. Again, since theory does not suggest one effect to dominate the other, I 
hypothesize no sign for nonaudit services. 
  Finally, no signs are hypothesized for measures of audit complexity (number of reports 
provided to management, number of locations visited by the auditor during the audit, foreign 
proportion of assets, and the ratio of receivables and inventory to total assets). Although these 
measures are expected and have been found to be positively associated with both audit fees 
and (surrogates of) audit costs, it is not clear how this will affect the ratio of audit fees to 15 
audit costs, as it depends on the extent to which the effect of these complexity measures on 
audit costs is passed on to the clients through the fees. If the entire effect is passed on to the 
clients through fees, there may very well be no effect on the ratio of fees to costs at all. 
However, if the effect is passed on only partially, the effect on profitability may be negative. 
Since I have no a priori reason to expect one effect to dominate the other, I do not hypothesize 
any sign for the complexity measures. 
  As a marginal but important note, in line with O’Keefe et al. (1994) I assume that a 
particular audit firm produces a fixed level of assurance across audit engagements at a 
moment in time. That is, a firm’s audit quality level is assumed to be fixed at any moment in 
time. Since the data in this study come from a single audit firm and concern audits conducted 
in a single year, a fixed level of assurance (audit quality) may also be assumed in this study. 
This implies that any differences in profitability across engagements are not associated with 
quality differences. 
 
3.4 Independent variables from prior industrial organization research 
Prior industrial organization research (see Section 2) has included a number of variables in its 
profitability models, either as experimental or as control variables. The experimental variables 
fall into three broad categories: market share and market concentration, entry barrier 
conditions, and other variables such as growth and capital intensity. Control variables are 
added to correct for differences between economic and accounting profits, to remedy incorrect 
market definitions and to control for imports and exports and for locality (instead of 
nationality) of many markets.  
  The setting of the current study precludes many of the variables mentioned above from 
inclusion in the audit engagement profitability model. Since I focus on one industry, and even 
one firm, factors included in prior research that vary across firms and industries, such as 16 
advertising and capital intensity and scale barriers, cannot be included in this study’s model. 
In addition, factors that do not vary across local markets cannot be included in the profitability 
model either. The most salient example of this would be regulation and legislation. The data 
in this study come from the Netherlands, where laws and regulations relevant to the current 
study have national enforcement and legitimacy.  
Furthermore, the study’s focus on the audit industry renders a number of factors irrelevant. 
This mainly applies to issues as import and export competition and audit licensing and 
certification requirements.
10 In the country setting of this study import and export audit 
market competition are prevented by two types of barriers (see European Commission 1996; 
Buijink et al. 1998, 401): (1) national barriers in the form of national licensing regimes and 
restrictions on the foreign ownership and management of audit firms; and (2) the requirement 
of country-specific auditing knowledge resulting from national differences in business 
practices, social security systems, tax regimes and applicable laws and regulations.  
  While national licensing regimes may prevent or hinder auditors in competing across 
national borders, they do not restrain competition within national borders. Although licensing 
and certification requirements limit the right to provide audit services to qualified individuals 
(see Dopuch and Simunic 1980, 83), they are not likely to restrict competition, as there are 
many opportunities to obtain a license (Maijoor et al. 1995, 170). Furthermore, evidence that 
net entry into the Dutch audit market was substantial under the licensing regime and even 
higher than during the pre-licensing period suggests that the regime does not present a major 
barrier to entry into the audit market (Maijoor et al. 1995, 170). Experience requirements were 
not yet in place in the year for which the data for this study were collected, rendering this 
possible barrier irrelevant for this study.  
  The variables suitable for inclusion in the audit engagement profitability model, then, are 
market concentration and/or market shares. Industrial organization research suggests a number 17 
of measures (Scherer and Ross 1990, 422; Carlton and Perloff 1994, 344; Besanko et al. 1996, 
285-287): (1) the N-firm concentration ratio (usually written as CRn), representing the 
combined market share of the N largest firms in the market. The most commonly used ratios 
are the four-firm (CR4) and eight-firm (CR8) concentration ratio; (2) the Herfindahl index (or 
H), equaling the sum of the squared market shares of each firm in the market. Whereas the N-
firm concentration ratio only focuses on the N largest firms in the market, the Herfindahl 
index takes all firms in the market into consideration. Furthermore, the Herfindahl index takes 
the relative size of each firm into account; and (3) market share, which is simply the share of 
each individual firm in the market. Each of these measures has also been used extensively in 
studies on auditor market concentration (see e.g. Eichenseher and Danos 1981; Moizer and 
Turley 1987; Tomczyk and Read 1989; Wootton et al. 1994; Weets and Jegers 1997), and will 
therefore also be tested in this study’s audit engagement profitability model. Following 
industrial organization research, the relationship between each of these market structure 
measures and audit engagement profitability is expected to be positive. As stated earlier, 
whether a (possible) positive association is a sign of market power or efficiency cannot be 
determined within the scope of this paper. 
 
3.5 Local audit market definition 
As indicated in Section 2, audit markets seem to be local or regional rather than national. 
Therefore, in this study the market concentration and market share measures discussed above 
will be measured on a local instead of national level. I use and test for three definitions of 
local markets. In order of increasing individual local market size these are: (1) the so-called 
Corop-definition, developed around 1970 by the Coördinatie Commissie Regionaal 
Onderzoeksprogramma (Coordination Commission Regional Research program), to which it 
owes its name. In this definition, the Netherlands is subdivided into 40 areas according to the 18 
nodal principle of classification, in which the range of influence of a central place and the 
functional relationship between these central places is taken into consideration; (2) the so-
called RBA-definition, revised in 1996, which divides the Netherlands in 18 areas for the 
Regionale Besturen voor de Arbeidsvoorziening (Regional Administrations for Labor 
provision). Both definitions are definitions at the meso-level, and are used extensively by the 
Dutch Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau for Statistics) in publishing national 
statistics on a wide range of subjects. Both the Corop-definition and RBA-definition are part 
of the hierarchically composed Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 
created by the European Office for Statistics (Eurostat) used for presentation of regional 
statistics within the European Community (Raets and van Batenburg, 1983; Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek 1997a, 1997b); and (3) the distinction between the so-called Randstad and 
the area outside the Randstad. The Randstad is the dense central area in the western part of the 
Netherlands, including the relatively close cities of Amsterdam, Den Haag (The Hague), 
Rotterdam and Utrecht. The Randstad contrasts sharply with the rest of the Netherlands in 
terms of (type of) economic activity, employment and contribution to the national product.
11 




The audit engagement profitability model used in this study can be presented as follows: the 
dependent variable audit engagement profitability, defined as the ratio of audit fees to total 
audit costs, is expected to be related to a number of independent variables derived from prior 
audit fee and production research (see Table 1 above), and a measure for (local) market 
concentration and/or market share derived from prior industrial organization literature. The 
model specification is based on those used in previous audit fee and production research, with 19 
the exception that, following Simunic and Stein (1996), Dopuch et al. (2000) and industrial 
organization research, I do not use a natural log transformation for the dependent variable. 
Thus, the model can be expressed as follows: 
p = β j0 + β j1 ln A + β j2 ln R + β j3 ln L + Σ  β ji γ i + ε i. 
In this formulation, p represents the profitability of a specific audit engagement, A indicates 
client size, R number of reports provided to the management by the auditor, L the number of 
client locations visited during the audit, and γ i includes all other client characteristics as 
shown in Table 1, as well as a measure for local audit market structure. The hypothesized 
signs for each of the variables included in the model were discussed above.  
 
4. Data collection 
Data on the profitability measures and all other engagement characteristics described in the 
previous section were obtained from a survey among engagement partners of a (then) Big 6 
audit firm. Data on local audit market structure measures were obtained from a membership 
list of the Dutch professional organization of auditors. 
 
4.1 Survey: Profitability measures and engagement characteristics 
The survey instrument was designed in cooperation with the technical department of the audit 
firm, based on an extensive review of prior audit fee and production studies (see Section 2). 
The technical department also administered the survey. The instrument – in the form of an 
electronic spreadsheet – was sent to the audit engagement partners of each of the firm’s 
offices and was accompanied by a cover letter and an instruction. Prior to conducting the 
actual survey, instrument, cover letter and instruction were pilot tested. Some minor 
adjustments were made.
12  20 
  Great care was taken to obtain high quality data. The instruction accompanying the survey 
instrument specified selection criteria for the engagements to be included in the sample, and 
contained directions for filling out the spreadsheet. 
  The selection criteria indicated that the engagements to be included in the sample: (1) are 
financial statement audits. Reviews, compilations or special assignments are not to be 
considered; (2) pertain to the most recent audit; (3) concern clients in for-profit sectors. Prior 
audit fee research has shown that fee models for not-for-profit organizations differ from those 
using data for profit organizations (see e.g. Baber et al. 1987; Rubin 1988; Ward et al. 1994; 
Sanders et al. 1995); (4) do not concern clients in the financial services industry. Again, prior 
studies have found that fee and production models differ significantly between financial 
service industry clients and clients in other industries (see Simunic 1980; Simunic 1984; 
Palmrose 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Turpen 1990; Stein et al. 1994). No other restrictions as to the 
client’s industry were imposed; (5) concern listed and unlisted companies subject to a 
statutory audit requirement; (6) do not concern clients that are included in the Amsterdam 
Exchange Index (AEX) or the Amsterdam Midkap Index (AMX). Together, these indexes are 
comprised of the 50 most actively traded shares on the Amsterdam Stock exchange and 
include companies like Heineken, KLM and Philips. Many are fairly unique in their own 
right, and are likely to be outliers in the sample; (7) relate to clients that publish independent 
financial statements; and (8) are audits of either independent companies or subsidiaries. 
Holding companies should not be selected. The rational for this last criterion is that the audit 
engagement profitability (and thus audit fee, audit hour, and audit cost) data on the one hand 
and the data on client characteristics on the other need to concern one and the same entity. 
Audits of holding companies are often conducted in cooperation with other offices of the firm, 
either within the same country or abroad, or with other audit firms.
13 In such cases, especially 21 
obtaining all relevant hour and cost data is relatively complicated and may result in inaccurate 
data. 
  The directions for filling out the questionnaire asked the partners to retrieve the requested 
data from the firm’s internal billing records (which contains data on audit hours, internal 
billing rates and fees), and the firm’s electronic filing system (in which all kinds of client 
characteristics are recorded during the performance of audits). In addition, the directions 
clarified which particular data were to be collected, so as to minimize ambiguities. 
Furthermore, the partners were told that I would not be informed about the identity of the 
individual clients. 
  Each of the 25 offices of the firm received a request to supply data on 25 audit 
engagements, 18 offices agreed to participate, resulting in a total of 157 responses. Of these, 
114 responses are used in the analyses. Four responses are not usable because they do not 
meet the selection criteria discussed above
14, and 39 responses have missing values. 
 
4.2 Membership list: Local audit market structure measures 
In industrial organization research measures of concentration and market shares are usually 
based on sales revenues of the firms in the industry under consideration (see e.g. Scherer and 
Ross 1990, 422; Carlton and Perloff 1994, 344). Applied to the auditing industry, this would 
imply the use of audit fee as a measurement base. Unfortunately, for many countries data on 
audit fee are not available. The Netherlands are no exception: although audit fees are 
available, they are so only for a limited number of larger audit firms (see Langendijk 
1988Buijink et al. 1998, 392). The unavailability of fee data necessitates the use of surrogate 
measures. Prior audit market research has used a number of these surrogates as measurement 
bases: number of audits, client assets or sales, square root of client sales, and number of 
auditors per audit firm (see e.g. Eichenseher and Danos 1981, 481-482; Moizer and Turley 22 
1987, 118-119; Penno and Walther 1996, 91; Weets and Jegers 1997, 777). In the current 
study, I use the latter as the base for calculating the concentration and market share measures. 
Buijink et al. (1998, 392-393) mention three arguments for using this measurement base: (1) it 
is a direct measure of audit-firm size, since it is the employment of auditors that allows audit 
firms to offer services in the market. There is no a priori reason to expect audit fee to be a 
better proxy for firm size than a headcount; (2) since the audit industry is labor-intensive, 
there is likely to be a direct relation between a firm’s fees and the number of auditors it 
employs. Prior research confirms this (see Zind and Zéghal (1989) for the Canadian market 
and Meuwissen (1992) for the Dutch market); and (3) the effects of nonaudit services 
rendered by audit firms can be largely excluded. As will be discussed below, the Dutch 
membership lists from which data on the number of auditors per firm are obtained makes a 
distinction between auditors working in public practice and auditors involved in other 
activities, allowing to obtain an audit firm size measure which only reflects the firm’s audit 
activities and excludes other nonaudit activities. 
  Using a headcount enables one to obtain the total population of auditors working in public 
practice. Whereas prior studies using client data as measurement bases examine only a subset 
of the audit market (viz. audit firms that serve larger clients or clients listed on stock 
exchanges), using the number of auditors per firm allows covering the nearly complete audit 
market (see Maijoor et al. 1995, 156).  
  Data on the number of auditors per audit firm were obtained from a membership list of the 
Dutch professional organization of auditors.
15 The membership list used was for the same year 
as the year for which the audit engagement data were collected.  
Each membership list contains an auditor list with the following information per auditor: 
name, home address, home phone number, education, industry (i.e., public practice or not), 
level (partner or employee), name of the organization where the auditor is employed, and 23 
work phone number. The membership list also contains a listing of all audit firms and its 
offices/locations in the Netherlands, including the offices’ phone numbers. By combining this 
information with the work phone number indicated for each auditor, the location of the audit 
firm’s office where the auditor works in public practice can be determined.
16 This allows 
calculation of the number of auditors per location/office per firm, based on which the 
concentration and market share measures per local market can be computed. Using 
information provided son the local offices that performed each engagement in the sample, the 
appropriate local concentration and market share measures can be easily linked to the 
individual audit engagements. 
 
5. Analyses and results 
This section discusses the tests of the model developed in Section 3. After showing some 
descriptive statistics, I first present the results for the profitability model excluding the 
variables for market concentration or market share. For purposes of comparison I also test this 
model on audit fees and total audit costs, the measures that together constitute the profitability 
measure as defined in this paper. Then I report the results for testing the profitability model 
including the concentration or market share measures. 
 
5.1 Descriptives 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics on audit engagement profitability, audit fees, total 
audit costs and client and engagement characteristics for the 114 observations used in the 
analyses. 
[Table 2] 
The most salient finding is that although the profitability numbers cover a wide range, overall 
this audit firm makes a loss on its audit engagements: on average, only 95% of the costs per 24 
engagement are recovered. This would not seem to be consistent with collusive and/or 
monopoly behavior that allows firms to raise price above cost, and thus not with a lack of 
competition on the audit market (see Introduction and Section 2). Of course additional 
analyses are necessary to explain this finding, but at first sight it seems this result indicates 
that at least for this sample of audit engagements from this audit firm, audit profitability is 
slightly negative.  
Additionally, the descriptives show that the observations in this sample cover a rather broad 
size range. Furthermore, the average firm in the sample displays a fairly low amount of 
foreign activities; is financed by equity; does not have a very high profit margin; does not 
obtain many nonaudit (as compared to audit) services from their audit firm; receive an 
unqualified opinion; are audited by this audit firm for over 4 years; has a less than average 
inherent risk; has higher than average control quality; and finally, is an unlisted company.  
  Table 3 below presents the descriptive statistics on the market concentration and market 
share measures discussed in Section 3, for the 114 observations used in the analyses.
17  
[Table 3] 
At first sight the measures may seem rather low when compared to concentration and market 
share measures found in prior audit market structure studies. However, as Buijink et al. (1998, 
396) remark, measures based on number of auditors are generally decidedly lower than 
measures computed using other bases. Furthermore, the levels of the concentration and market 
share measures for my local market definitions are very well comparable to those reported by 
Buijink et al. (1998) for the national market. Nevertheless, the measures do cover some range, 
suggesting that there is some variation in concentration and market shares across local 
markets. A final remark with respect to Table 2 concerns the measures for the Randstad local 
market definition. As also indicated below in Section 5.3, using this local market definition 
effectively reduces the concentration and market share measures to dummy variables. 25 
Therefore, the minimum and maximum values indicated for this local market definition 
represent the 0 and 1, respectively, for each dummy variable. Without exception, the 
minimum value represents the value for the nonRandstad area, and the maximum value the 
value for the Randstad area.  
 
5.2 Profitability model without market concentration or market share variables 
Table 4 shows the OLS results of testing the profitability model excluding the market 
structure variables. 
[Table 4 here] 
Examination of pairwise correlations among the independent variables and of the variance-
inflation factors (Gujarati 1995, 328) shows that multicollinearity is not a problem.
18 Since 
application of Breusch-Pagan tests (Greene 2000, 509-510) indicates presence of 
heteroscedasticity for the models tested, the t-ratios presented are computed using White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation method.  
  The table shows that all models are significant at the 0.01 level. The results for audit fees 
and total audit costs confirm the results from prior research in that their adjusted R
2 is well 
inside the range of those reported by prior audit fee and production studies. In addition, 
measures of client size, client complexity, client asset composition, client risk and financial 
distress, quality of client internal controls, auditor’s tenure and the auditor’s provision of 
nonaudit services are determinants of both audit fees and total audit costs. Also in line with 
prior research, client size (proxied by (the natural log of) assets) seems to be the most 
important determinant of audit fees and total audit costs.  
  Even though the model itself is significant, the adjusted R
2 for the profitability model is 
decidedly lower than for the audit fee and audit cost model. Apparently, the factors that are 
able to explain audit fees and audit costs reasonably well, do not seem capable of doing so for 26 
the ratio of audit fees to audit costs. This confirms the results by Simunic and Stein (1996) 
and Dopuch et al. (2000).
19 However, the findings regarding the independent variables differ 
considerably from those of both papers. 
  In contrast to Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000), I find no evidence of a 
positive effect of client size. And contrary to the findings of Dopuch et al. (2000), nor do I for 
the provision of nonaudit services on profitability. It seems that for the sample used in the 
current study, the hypothesized effect of audit firm bargaining power on profitability is not 
present. Rather, for client size the effects of audit firm bargaining power and client bargaining 
power may have cancelled each other out. Likewise, for nonaudit services the audit firm 
bargaining power explanation and the loss-leader argument appear to be equally strong (or 
weak, for that matter).  
  Whereas the results by Dopuch et al. (2000) seem to be consistent with price-cutting in the 
initial two years of the audit engagement (without any accompanying systematic reduction in 
audit effort as evidenced by results for audit production regressions), the results for my 
sample allow no such conclusion. Although results for audit production regressions for the 
same sample reported in Schelleman and Maijoor (2001) agree with those by Dopuch et al. 
(2000) in that there seems to be no systematic reduction in audit effort, my results for the 
profitability model suggest an increase  in price relative to costs in the first year of the 
engagement, followed by a price cut in the third year of the engagement.  
  In the profitability model by Dopuch et al. (2000) reliance on internal control had an effect 
in the direction opposite to the one expected, as it appeared to increase rather than decrease 
the profitability measure. My sample neither confirms nor disaffirms this result, as the related 
variable control quality is not significant.
20 
  Simunic and Stein (1996) and Dopuch et al. (2000) find no evidence regarding the effect 
of risk indicators on audit engagement profitability. In contrast, the findings for my sample do 27 
provide results on this matter, be they conflicting. The risk indicator loss in last two years has 
a significantly positive sign, as expected. However, the indicator opinion has a sign that is 
significant, but opposite of the one hypothesized: the issuance of an other than unqualified 
opinion decreases rather than increases engagement profitability. I have no explanation for 
this anomalous result.  
  Dopuch et al. (2000) find no significant effects for their complexity measures. For this 
study’s sample, only the complexity variable consisting of the ratio of receivables and 
inventory to total assets is significant in this profitability model. The coefficient for this 
variable has a positive sign: a higher ratio increases audit engagement profitability. Keeping 
in mind what I stated in Section 3 on the possible effects of complexity variables on audit 
engagement profitability, this could imply that the effect of this complexity measure on audit 
costs is more than wholly passed on the client through audit fees (i.e. with a profit mark-up). 
  As indicated earlier in Sections 2 and 3, Dopuch et al. (2000) included measures 
representing cost and labor (in)efficiency of the engagements in their profitability model. 
They find a relationship between the efficiency measures and the profitability measure that is 
significantly positive, which they interpret as indicating that excess costs and labor hours do 
indeed represent inefficiencies for their sample. More efficient audits should lead to higher 
ratio of fees to costs, and inefficiencies lead the firm to discount its billing rates, thus 
rendering these inefficiencies costly to the audit firm. As noted, the audit engagements in this 
study’s sample are cost and labor efficient (see Schelleman and Maijoor 2001). Therefore no 
inefficiency measures are included in this study’s model.  
 
5.3 Profitability model including market concentration or market share variables 
In Section 3 a number of concentration and market share measures were suggested for 
inclusion in the audit engagement profitability model, for a number of different local market 28 
definitions. The measures are: the concentration ratio for the four largest firms (CR4), the 
concentration for the eight largest firms (CR8), the Herfindahl index (H), and firm market 
share. The local market definitions are: the 40-area Corop-definition, the 18-area RBA 
definition, and the distinction between the Randstad-area and the area outside the Randstad. 
For most measures and local market definitions, addition of a concentration or market share 
measure to the audit engagement profitability model did not lead to a substantial increase of 
the model fit.
21 In fact, and more specifically, addition of such a measure generally led to a 
decline of the adjusted R
2. Evidently, in such cases the added concentration or market share 
measure was not significant at conventional levels.
22  
The exception to this general finding was for measures with the Randstad local market 
definition.
23 
24 Apart from the specific coefficient values, similar results were obtained for 
each of the measures mentioned, since using the Randstad-nonRandstad dichotomy 
effectively reduces these measures to a dummy variable.
25 Although I could therefore have 
used any of the concentration or market share measures, I have used the market share measure 
in Table 5 below since prior industrial organization research indicates that this measure seems 
to have more explanatory power than concentration measures. 
[Table 5 here] 
Again, examination of pairwise correlations among the independent variables and of the 
variance-inflation factors (Gujarati 1995, 328) shows that multicollinearity is not a problem.
26 
Since application of Breusch-Pagan tests (Greene 2000,509-510) indicates presence of 
heteroscedasticity, the t-ratios presented are computed using White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimation method.  
  Addition of the market share measure increases the adjusted R
2 from 0.13 to 0.15. Apart 
from the significance of this market share variable, addition of this variable does not 
effectively change the results for the profitability model. The model is again significant at the 29 
0.01 level, and except for the specific coefficient values the results for the other explanatory 
variables, which were discussed above, are unchanged.  
  As expected, the Randstad market share variable is significantly positive, suggesting that 
the firm’s higher market share (or concentration for that matter) in the local audit market, 
defined here as the Randstad versus the nonRandstad area, increases audit engagement 
profitability. In fact, profitability in the Randstad area is a little over 6% higher than 
profitability in the area outside the Randstad.
27  
Higher market share (or concentration) seems to allow this audit firm to raise price above 
cost. This type of result would seem to be consistent with either the market power explanation 
that mainstream industrial organization research has generally attributed to evidence of this 
kind, or the efficiency explanation that the Chicago-UCLA school adheres to. As indicated 
earlier, the current paper does not intend to distinguish between these two explanations; in 
fact, the data do not allow this. Data on more (or preferably: all) firms, and for more than one 
year, in the audit industry are necessary to do so. Combined with the finding from Schelleman 
and Maijoor (2001) that the same sample of audit engagements as used in this paper is cost 
and labor efficient, however, the positive relationship between market share and profitability 
found in this paper could point towards the efficiency explanation.  
  Alternatively, the positive coefficient for the market share measure may simply be due to 
differences between the Randstad area and the area outside the Randstad. As stated, using the 
Randstad-nonRandstad dichotomy effectively reduces these measures to a dummy variable. 
Therefore, this variable may very well be capturing other issues than just market structure 
differences. For instance, it is possible that clients in the Randstad area have a higher ability to 
pay than clients outside this area.
28 However, the variable profit margin, which is generally 
thought as a measure to control for ability to pay effects (see Taylor and Baker 1981, 57; 
Brinn et al. 1994, 107), is included in the profitability model shown above, although it is 30 
insignificant. Furthermore, the correlation between client profit margin and the Randstad 
dummy is low and insignificant, suggesting that this ability to pay effect may not hold for this 
sample. Of course it is possible that for this sample profit margin is not a good proxy for 
ability to pay, and that other proxies might perform better.  
  Finally, although addition of the market share measure seems to increase the explanatory 
power of the model to some extent, the model fit is still relatively poor, certainly compared to 
that for audit fee and audit cost – and audit production – models. The majority of the variation 
in the profitability measure remains to be explained and suggests the model should be 
extended. Some suggestions for extensions will be discussed in the following section. 
Alternatively, and more conceptually, the low explanatory power of the profitability model 
may also be an indicator of a competitive market. Based on micro-economic theory it can be 
expected that for a cross-section, profit is a random error term if markets are perfectly 
competitive. This is analogous to the presumption and finding by Fama and French (2000, 
161) that for time-series competition in the market induces mean reverting profitability. 
Similarly, future research is needed to explore this issue.  
 
6. Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future research 
This final section presents a conclusion to the paper by summarizing the study’s findings, 
discussing its limitations, and providing suggestions for future research. As the discussion will 
show, many suggestions are related to the limitations and logically follow from these.  
  This paper has investigated the profitability of audit engagements. Prior research on this 
subject is scarce and draws its models mainly from audit fee and production research. This 
paper has attempted to provide a more complete picture by integrating insights from audit fee 
and production studies, industrial organization research, and the fairly recent literature on 
local (rather than national) audit markets. The model thus constructed was tested on a sample 31 
of 114 audit engagements from one of the (then) Big 6 audit firms. The findings indicate that 
variables known from prior audit fee and production research may be very well able to explain 
the measures that together constitute this study’s profitability measure (viz., audit fees and 
total audit costs), but not this profitability measure itself, as the adjusted R
2 for the 
profitability model is decidedly lower than that of either the audit fee model or the audit cost 
model. This finding confirms the scarce prior research in this area. However, the results for 
the independent variables do not always agree with this prior research, as this study: (1) does 
not find an expected effect of audit firm bargaining power on profitability; (2) shows no 
evidence of price-cutting in the initial two years of the engagement, but rather a price-increase 
in the first year of the engagement and a price-cut in the third year of the engagement; (3) 
does not indicate an effect of internal control quality on audit engagement profitability; but (4) 
does show effects of risk indicators on audit engagement profitability, even though these 
effects are to some extent contradictory. Furthermore, whereas prior research does not find 
evidence of effects of complexity measures on profitability, this study suggests that (some 
measure of) complexity increases audit engagement profitability. The local market share 
measure
29 that was added to the basic model derived from audit fee and production research is 
significantly positive as expected, suggesting that a higher market share allows the audit firm 
to raise price above cost. Whether this should be interpreted as a sign of market power or of 
efficiency remains to be determined, and more research with data on more audit firms and for 
more years is needed to be able to do so. Also, some alternative explanations (that cannot be 
ruled out) for the positive sign of the market share variable were offered in Section 5. 
  Although the model fit improves somewhat after adding the market structure measure the 
explanatory power is still relatively low. Most of the variation in the profitability measure 
remains to be explained and suggests the model should be extended. Besides the suggestion to 
include measures of market competition as done in this study, Dopuch et al. (2000) also 32 
propose that client satisfaction with the auditor and audit team (which effect on audit fees has 
been investigated by Behn et al. 1999) might have an impact on profitability.  
  Furthermore, industrial organization research suggests that in addition to supplier market 
power, buyer market power could be an important countervailing influence that could lead to 
a downward pressure on prices (see e.g. Martin 1993b, 478-479; Carlton and Perloff 1994, 
348). A slightly different but related issue is the finding by Kwon (1996) that concentration in 
the client industry impacts on the client’s auditor selection decision. More specifically, higher 
client concentration increases the clients’ preference to select auditors different from those of 
the clients’ competitors. Competition of audit firms does not seem to be homogenous across 
client industries served by the audit firms. This result suggests that client concentration could 
also have an effect on audit engagement profitability.  
  Another issue that might impact on audit engagement profitability is product 
differentiation. Prior fee research has shown that Big 8/6/5 auditees generally pay higher fees 
than do non-Big 8/6/5 auditees (see e.g. Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Palmrose 
1986a; Turpen 1990). Furthermore, evidence indicates that there are also some pricing 
differences among the Big 8/6/5 firms (see e.g. Simunic 1980; Firth 1993; Gist 1994;). In 
combination with a competitive market (which is generally suggested by prior audit fee 
research, see Section2), these differences in pricing could indicate auditor product 
differentiation (see Simunic 1980, 171). Based on these findings one could also expect an 
effect of product differentiation on audit engagement profitability. However, testing this effect 
once again requires data on more than one audit firm.  
  A related matter is the possible effect of industry expertise on audit engagement 
profitability. Again, prior research indicates that industry expertise increases audit fees (see 
e.g. Craswell et al. 1995), suggesting that industry expertise could have a similar effect on 33 
audit engagement profitability. Size and (industry) composition of the sample precludes from 
testing for this effect, and more data than available for this study are necessary to do so. 
  Alternatively, as suggested at the end of Section 5, the low explanatory power of the 
profitability model may simply indicate that the audit market is competitive, since profits in a 
perfectly competitive market are hypothesized to be a random error term. This is also an 
interesting issue for future research. 
  Some of the limitations of this study have already been mentioned above. As this paper 
only considers one audit firm, and for one year, the generalizability of the conclusions is 
limited. Therefore, more research on audit engagement profitability using data on more than 
one audit firm and for more than one year is necessary. As stated, this might also provide 
some more evidence on the market power versus efficiency explanation regarding the 
relationship between market structure and profitability.  
Another limitation concerns the measures for concentration and market share used in this 
study. As indicated in Section 4, the base for calculating this measure in this study was the 
number of auditors per audit firm. Although research has shown that this base might be just as 
good (or as bad, for that matter) as any other base for computing these measures, it is very 
well possible that the measures in this study might misrepresent actual concentration and or 
market share. Future research might provide answers by testing for this.  
A related, more fundamental issue is whether concentration and market share measures 
accurately reflect competition on the market. Discussion on this matter is not new and has 
been brought up many times, also in the auditing context (see e.g. Simunic 1980, 159; Dopuch 
and Simunic 1980, 78; Dopuch and Simunic 1982, 403). Buijink et al. (1998) show that high 
concentration does not necessarily imply less competition, as high mobility in audit firm 
market shares – an indicator of a high degree of market competition – coexists with high 
levels of market concentration for their sample.
30 As a suggestion for further research, future 34 
studies could consider using these dynamic – rather than the conventional static – measures of 
market structure. Of course, this would require data for more years and more firms.  
Finally, prior audit research suggests that auditor frequently engage in underreporting of time 
to meet time budgets (see e.g. Kelley and Margheim, 1987; 1990; Otley and Pierce 1996; 
Akers et al. 1998-99). If this were true for the data in this study’s sample, it would increase 
the observed profitability relative to the true profitability, and lower the profitability of 
accurately reported engagements relative to engagements for which time was underreported 
(see also Dopuch et al. 2000, 8). Although the audit firm that provided the data indicated that 
their employees are urged to report actual hours worked, and to not underreport to meet the 
budget, I can of course not be certain that this is indeed the case for the engagements in this 
study’s sample. However, even though I do not know whether auditor have underreported or 
not, results from Schelleman and Maijoor (2001) for the same sample indicate that if auditors 
have underreported, they have at least done so consistently for all engagements in the same 
sample, suggesting that relative profitability (i.e. profitability of one engagement relative to 
all other engagements) should not have to be distorted. 35 
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Table 1 
Variables included in audit engagement profitability model based on 
prior audit fee and production research 
  
  Expected 
Independent variables:  sign 
    
Assets (natural log)  ? 
Nr. of reports provided to management (natural log)  ? 
Nr. of locations visited by the auditor during the audit (natural log)  ? 
Opinion type: (0,1), where 1 indicates other than unqualified opinion  + 
Foreign proportion of assets  ? 
Leverage (Long term liabilities/Total assets)  + 
First year client: (0, 1), where 1 indicates a first year client  - 
Second year client: (0, 1), where 1 indicates a second year client  - 
Third year client: (0, 1), where 1 indicates a third year client  - 
Fourth year client: (0, 1), where 1 indicates a fourth year client  - 
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets  ? 
Profit margin (Net result/Total sales)  - 
Nonaudit fee/audit fee  ? 
Inherent risk: (0,1), where 1 indicates greater than average risk  + 
Control quality: (0,1), where 1 indicates higher than average quality  - 
Loss in last two years: (0,1), where 1 indicates an operating loss in the last two years + 
Listed: (0,1), where 1 indicates a company listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange + 




Descriptive statistics for audit engagement profitability, audit fees, total audit costs and client and engagemen  
characteristics for 114 financial statement audits 
                    
  Mean Std.  Dev.  Median  Minimum  Maximum   
                 
Continuous variables        
Profitability  0.95 0.16 0.98 0.42 1.43   
Audit  fees  84,544.63  136,917.30 54,000.00 11,500.00  1,249,000.00   
Total audit costs  90,866.28  147,262.40  56,237.50  14,525.00  1,248,970.00  
Assets (in NLG 000's)  190,000.00  792,000.00  32,800.00  4,633.29  6,870,000.00  
Nr. of reports provided to management  1.99  1.61  2.00  1.00  12.00  
Nr. of locations visited by the auditor during the audit  2.00  2.65  1.00  1.00  25.00  
Foreign  proportion  of  assets  0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00   
Leverage (Long term liabilities/Total assets)  0.12  0.17  0.03  0.00  0.82  
(Receivables  +  Inventory)/Total  assets  0.56 0.26 0.59 0.04 1.91 
# 
Profit margin (Net result/Total sales)  0.04  0.08  0.03  -0.33  0.51  
Nonaudit  fee/audit  fee  0.46 0.91 0.16 0.00 6.20   
                    
Categorical variables        
Opinion type: (0,1), where 1 indicates other than unqualified opinion  0.05  0.22  0.00  0.00  1.00  
First year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a first year client  0.02  0.13  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Second year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a second year client  0.04  0.21  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Third year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a third year client  0.05  0.22  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Fourth year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a fourth year client  0.04  0.21  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Inherent risk: (0,1), where 1 indicates greater than average risk  0.11  0.32  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Control quality : (0,1), where 1 indicates higher than average quality  0.61  0.49  1.00  0.00  1.00  
Loss in last two years: (0,1) where 1 indicates an operating loss in the  0.11  0.31  0.00  0.00  1.00  
  last two years             
Listed: (0,1), where 1 indicates a company listed on the Amsterdam  0.18  0.38  0.00  0.00  1.00  
    Stock  Exchange         




Descriptive statistics for market concentration and market share measures for 114 financial 
statement audits 
                 
  Mean Std.  Dev.  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
                 
Corop local market definition       
CR4  0.51 0.11 0.49 0.40 0.86 
CR8  0.71 0.10 0.67 0.53 1.00 
Herfindahl  index  0.09 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.23 
Audit firm market share  0.14  0.05  0.13  0.05  0.23 
                 
RBA local market definition       
CR4  0.46 0.07 0.45 0.40 0.61 
CR8  0.65 0.07 0.63 0.52 0.79 
Herfindahl  index  0.07 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.11 
Audit firm market share  0.13  0.03  0.13  0.03  0.21 
                 
Randstad local market definition       
CR4  0.44 0.06 0.40 0.40 0.53 
CR8  0.57 0.05 0.53 0.53 0.64 
Herfindahl  index  0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.08 
Audit firm market share  0.11  0.02  0.09  0.09  0.14 
                 




OLS regression of (ln) audit fees, (ln) total audit costs, and profitability on client characteristics 
for 114 financial statement audits 
  
  Exp.           E x p .      
Independent variables:  sign  Audit fees
1 Total  costs
1 sign  Profitability
1 
      coeff. t-ratio     coeff. t-ratio        coeff. t-ratio    
Intercept ?  -- 
2 -- 
2 ***  -- 
2 -- 
2 ***  ? -- 
2 -- 
2 *** 
Assets (natural log)  +  0.299  5.142 ***  0.322 6.930  ***  ? -0.017  -0.921   
Nr. of reports (natural log)  +  0.174  1.665 **  0.209 2.122  ***  ? -0.033  -0.980   
Nr. of locations (natural log)  +  0.323  3.683 ***  0.292 3.446  ***  ? 0.025  1.031   
Opinion type  +  -0.278  -1.589   0.001 0.008    +  -0.238 -3.314  *** 
Foreign proportion of assets  +  0.683  1.723 **  0.584 1.488  *  ? 0.083  0.496   
Leverage +  -0.370  -1.133    -0.331 -1.095    + -0.047  -0.429   
First year client  +  -0.081  -0.414   -0.249 -1.163    -  0.153 2.808  *** 
Second year client  +  -0.455  -1.576   -0.391 -1.482    - -0.069  -1.198   
Third year client  +  -0.140  -0.905   -0.056 -0.356    - -0.082  -1.748  *** 
Fourth year client  +  0.234  1.185   0.370 1.342  *  - -0.100  -0.905   
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets  +  0.177  1.094   -0.005 -0.031    ? 0.146  1.753  * 
Profit margin  -  -1.179  -1.388 *  -1.185 -1.349  *  - 0.045  0.134   
Nonaudit fee/audit fee  -  -0.089  -1.367 *  -0.086 -1.361  *  ? -0.003  -0.266   
Inherent risk  +  0.108  0.831   0.159 1.337  *  + -0.041  -1.149   
Control quality  -  0.139  1.443   0.097 1.109    - 0.026  0.742   
Loss in last two years  +  0.362  2.817 ***  0.240 2.270  **  + 0.129  1.998  ** 
Listed +  0.049  0.369    0.017 0.128    + 0.029  0.662   
                                   
Overall F-test    21.56 ***   16.98 ***    3.24  ***  
Adjusted R
2   0.73      0.75      0.13     
                                   
1 t-statistics are calculated using White's correction for heteroscedasticity 
2 Intercept deleted at the request of the firm providing our data 
Significance: * p <.10 level , ** p <.05 level, *** p <.01 level (tested one or two tailed, where appropriate) 





OLS regression of (ln) audit fees, (ln) total audit costs, and 
profitability on client characteristics and market structure 
for 114 financial statement audits 
 
  Exp.     
Independent variables:  sign  Profitability
1 
   coeff. t-ratio   
Intercept ?  --
2 --
2 *** 
Assets (natural log)  ?  -0.018  -1.013  
Nr. of reports (natural log)  ?  -0.044  -1.280  
Nr. of locations (natural log)  ?  0.024  0.998  
Opinion type  +  -0.222 -3.306  *** 
Foreign proportion of assets  ?  0.058  0.341  
Leverage +  -0.016  -0.148   
First year client  -  0.160 3.127  *** 
Second year client  -  -0.062  -1.085  
Third year client  -  -0.079  -1.544 * 
Fourth year client  -  -0.112  -0.938  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets  ?  0.160  1.967 * 
Profit margin  -  -0.010  -0.030  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee  ?  0.003  0.223  
Inherent risk  +  -0.055  -1.513  
Control quality  -  0.035  0.996  
Loss in last two years  +  0.119  1.934 ** 
Listed +  0.052  1.189   
Market share  +  1.233  1.698 ** 
        
Overall F-test    3.24 ***  
Adjusted R
2   0.15     
        
1 t-statistics are calculated using White's correction for heteroskedasticity 
2 Intercept deleted at the request of the firm providing our data 
Significance: * p <.10 level , ** p <.05 level, *** p <.01 level (tested one or two 
tailed, where appropriate) 
Note: coefficients and t-ratios that have a sign opposite to its predicted sign and 




1 However, as discussed later on, a number of studies have related (measures of) market structure to audit fees. 
 
2 However, in their conclusion Dopuch et al. (2000, 25) do suggest that additional client specific factors, such as 
the degree of local competition and client satisfaction with the auditor and audit team may be important in 
explaining profitability As the remainder of this paper will show, I attempt to test for the effect of local audit 
competition, thus taking up one of their suggestions. 
 
3 A discussion of this profitability measure is provided in Section 3 on the variables and model used in the 
current study. 
 
4 However, as indicated further on in this section, we do test for the possible effects of nonaudit services on this 
profitability measure.  
 
5 As will be discussed in Section 4, the sample was restricted to financial statement audits (reviews, compilations 
and special assignments were not considered) for companies subject to a statutory audit requirement, reflecting a 
very clear-cut audit market definition.  
 
6 The model to be described has also been tested on a price-cost margin type profitability measure, defined in the 
context of this study as the difference between audit fees and total audit costs, divided by total audit costs. Apart 
from slight differences in significance levels, the results for this model – not reported here to save space – are 
qualitatively the same as those for the model having the realization rate as profitability measure (which results 
are reported in Section 5 of this paper). 
 
7 As discussed in Schelleman and Maijoor (2001, 15), in the data the following staff levels are distinguished: 
partner, manager, supervisor, assistant, and supporting activities. As indicated in the same paper, the latter 
category differs from the first four in that in contrast to the partners, managers, supervisors and assistants, the 
employees performing the supporting activities are not part of the audit team. Conducting mostly secretarial and 
related activities, their duties are less of an audit nature than are those of other levels. The costs of this category 
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are nonetheless included in the audit cost measure so as to provide a complete picture of the costs related to the 
audit production process.  
 
8 As Dopuch et al. (2000, 8) themselves indicate, a weakness of their surrogate (i.e., standard fees) is that the 
level of costs and standard fees may vary geographically. 
 
9 Based on these prior studies, the (negative) coefficients for the auditor tenure indicators are expected to be 
ordered as follows: first year client < second year client < third year client < fourth year client.  
 
10 Like most laws and regulations in the Netherlands, regulation with respect to auditor licensing and certification 
has national enforcement. Therefore, even if this regulation were to be an entry barrier (which, as the discussion 
below will show, it very likely is not), its effect would not differ across local audit markets and thus would not be 
included in this study’s profitability model. 
 
11 Although the Randstad covers only 20% of Dutch territory, nearly half of the Dutch people lives and works in 
the area: 44% of the Dutch population is housed in the Randstad, 48% of all jobs are located there, and in 1997 
almost 49% of the Gross National Product is earned in the area (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2000a). More 
than half of the jobs in the Randstad are in commercial services, a proportion that is significantly higher than the 
national average (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2000b). 
 
12 The data collected during this pilot test are not included in the final data set used in the current study. 
 
13 This does not conflict with the assumption that audit markets may be local rather than national (or even 
global). As Francis et al. (1999, 188) indicate, “.(…)..For larger clients with geographically dispersed operations, 
the local offices which contract for audits must also credibly demonstrate their ability to oversee an audit that 
may require the use of other offices of the firm.(…)..These engagements are performed under the close 
supervision of the engagement partner in the local office that contracts with the client and signs the audit report. 
The contracting office plans the engagement, performs critical parts of the audit, coordinates and reviews the 
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work delegated to other offices, and has final responsibility for issuing the audit report.(…).”. However, as will 
be stated, it may complicate the collection of accurate data for this study.  
 
14 One response concerned an audit for consolidation purposes, another was a review, a third was a compilation 
and a fourth was a holding company. 
 
15 In the Netherlands, two types of professionals are permitted to perform statutory audits (see Meuwissen 1999, 
148-149): (1) registered auditors, associated with the Royal Dutch Institute of Registered Auditors (Koninklijk 
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, or Koninklijk NivRA), who were granted this right according to 
the 1962 Act on Registered Auditors; (2) certified accountants, listed with the Dutch Association of Certified 
Accountants (Nederlandse Orde van Accountants-Administratieconsulenten, NovAA), according to the 1993 Act 
on Certified Accountants. Prior to this 1993 Act, only registered auditors (listed with NIvRA) were allowed to 
provide audit services. Furthermore, research commissioned by NIvRA (see NIvRA 2000) has shown that in 
1997 (the year for which data used in this study were collected), 4 years after the 1993 Act came into force, 98% 
of the companies subject to a statutory audit requirement have their financial statements audited by a registered 
auditor. Certified accountants audit only 2% of the companies subject to a statutory audit. Therefore in this paper 
only the membership listed for the registered auditors listed with the Royal NIvRA are used for determining 
concentration and market share measures.  
 
16 If auditors work for more than one firm, I counted them with the largest of the firms, following Buijink et al. 
(1998, 400). If auditors are listed with more than one of the firm’s offices in the audit firm list, I counted the 
auditor with the office to which the auditor’s work phone number belongs. As a sensitivity test, I also performed 
the analyses described in Section 5 with concentration and market share measures for which auditors working for 
more than one firm and/or office are allocated equally to the firms and/or offices for which they work. This 
makes no difference to the results and conclusions.  
 
17 Of course, only a subset of the available concentration and market share measures were used in computing 




18 These statistics are not presented here to save space but are available on request. 
 
19 Contrary to Dopuch et al. (2000) Simunic and Stein (1996) do not test the same model for audit fees and audit 
engagement profitability (and note: they do not test any audit cost model), as their audit fee model contains a 
number of complexity measures in addition to the risk indicators that are included in the profitability model. 
Therefore, a direct comparison between their audit fee and their audit engagement profitability model cannot be 
made. However, as an indication, their audit fee model has an adjusted R
2 of 0.85, and their profitability model 
an adjusted R
2 of 0.051, implying a similar difference in explanatory power as in Dopuch et al. (2000). 
 
20 The measure control reliance used by Dopuch et al. (2000) can be expected to be related to the measure control 
quality used in the current paper in the sense that according to the audit risk model (see e.g. Arens and 
Loebbecke 2000, 269) a higher quality of controls would result in a lower assessed control risk, implying more 
reliance on these controls, an increase in the planned detection risk, allowing a reduction in the planned 
substantive tests. However, results in O’Keefe et al. (1994, 252) for the same sample as used in Dopuch et al. 
(2000) show that for over 90 percent of the sample no or limited reliance was placed on controls, and that in 
some cases no reliance whatsoever was placed on controls of excellent quality. Since I have no data on control 
reliance for my sample I can neither confirm nor negate whether this finding holds for my sample. Also, this 
unavailability of control reliance data leaves me to use the variable control quality (which is available for my 
sample) rather than reliance on controls in the profitability model. 
 
21 When both a concentration and market share measure (both for the same local market definition) were added 
to the same basic profitability model, model fit did not increase either, as both the concentration and market 
share measures were insignificant at conventional levels. This contradicts findings from prior industrial 
organization research that generally show a significant positive effect for market share measures, that in addition 
dominates the effect of concentration measures.  
 




23 A possible explanation for the fact that only measures with the Randstad local market definition were 
significant might be that the other two local market definitions (i.e. Corop and RBA) divides the country in too 
many (and therefore too small) individual local markets, possibly even more so because certainly compared to 
the US or Australia (the only two other countries for which audit research has investigated local audit markets, 
see Section 2), the Netherlands is a very small country. For both the Corop and the RBA definitions there is 
substantive variation in the market concentration and market share measures in general. However, it is of course 
possible that the distribution of the 114 engagements in the sample over the local markets is such that this 
variation is reduced, perhaps leading to insignificance of the concentration and market share measures for the 
Corop and RBA definitions in the profitability model. 
 
24 For this sample, 33% of the audits were performed in the Randstad area, and 67% outside this area.  
 
25 This fact also precludes testing whether, in line with prior industrial organization research, the effect of market 
share dominates that of concentration. As stated, for the Randstad local market definition both measures reduce 
to a dummy variable. In this case, inclusion of both a concentration and market share measure results in one of 
the two being dropped from the regression equation. 
 
26 Again, these statistics are not presented here to save space. 
 
27 Using mean values for all other independent variables in the audit engagement profitability model, mean 
profitability amounts to 0.99 for engagements in the Randstad area, and 0.94 for engagements outside this area. 
 
28 Evidence from the Dutch Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek shows that all areas of the Netherlands that have 
the highest disposable income are located in the Randstad area (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 1999).  
 
 
29 Where the local markets are defined as the Randstad versus the area outside the Randstad.  
 
30 It should be noted that, as indicated earlier in Section 4, Buijink et al. (1998) also use the number of auditors 
per audit firm as the base for calculating their concentration and mobility measures.  
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